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Abstract 
 
Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living 
organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect 
the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel simulation program 
package, called ‘NetworGame’, which is able to simulate any type of social dilemma 
games on any model, or real world networks with any assignment of initial cooperation 
or defection strategies to network nodes. The ability of initially defecting single nodes to 
break overall cooperation was called as ‘game centrality’. The efficiency of this measure 
was verified on well-known social networks, and was extended to ‘protein games’, i.e. 
the simulation of cooperation between proteins, or their amino acids. Hubs and in 
particular, party hubs of yeast protein-protein interaction networks had a large 
influence to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection. Simulations on 
methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein structure network indicated an increased influence 
of nodes belonging to intra-protein signaling pathways on breaking cooperation. The 
efficiency of single, initially defecting nodes to convert the cooperation of other nodes to 
defection in social dilemma games may be an important measure to predict the 
importance of nodes in the integration and regulation of complex systems. Game 
centrality may help to design more efficient interventions to cellular networks (in forms 
of drugs), to ecosystems and social networks. 
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Introduction 
Cooperation is necessary for the emergence of complex, hierarchical biological organisms. 
Prisoner’s dilemma and hawk-dove games are social dilemma games played by agent-pairs 
having two strategies: cooperation or defection. These games are excellent models to 
elucidate the appearance of cooperation in situations, when agents generally prefer defection. 
Such situations are prevalent in evolutionary biology, where personal interests often confront 
with collective interests [1,2]. Recent reports defined 'signaling games' [3-6] or ‘protein 
games’ [7-9]. In protein games the applicability of social games was extended to protein-
protein interaction networks, where cooperation level of the whole system helped to assess 
the overall integration of network functions. Here we extend these ideas further, and show the 
applicability of the spatial game concept to protein structure networks (also called residue 
interaction networks) having amino acids as their nodes. 
 
In spatial games only those agents are playing with each other, who are neighbors in the 
underlying contact network. The level of cooperation is very sensitive to the topology of the 
agent network in a wide variety of social dilemma type games. Cooperation levels in square 
lattice, small world and scale-free network topologies have been widely assessed [10-17]. 
However, only a few studies were performed on real world networks [18,19] and even less 
studies examined the effects of pre-set starting cooperative and defective strategies on the 
development of cooperation at the network level [20,21]. Although, there are a number of 
spatial game-related programs [22-25], but none of them is able to simulate social dilemma 
games on real world networks with pre-set initial strategies.  
 
Following our conference report on an initial version of the program [26], here we introduce 
the improved version of a freely available simulation tool, called NetworGame able to 
simulate two-player, pairwise interacting social dilemma games on real world networks with 
any assignment of initial cooperation or defection strategies to network nodes. A novel 
dynamic centrality, called game centrality, is also defined, which measures the ability of 
individually defecting nodes to convert others to their strategy. We show the applicability of 
game centrality on social, protein-protein interaction and protein structure networks, and 
highlight the importance of hubs in the maintenance of cooperation in complex biological 
systems. 
Results 
 
NetworGame program for simulation of spatial games on any real-world networks  
Our novel NetworGame 2.0 program package is a cross-platform, generic tool to simulate 
repeated spatial games. This simulation program includes i.) options for pay-off matrices of 
any symmetric normal form games (with 2 strategies); ii.) well-known, replicator-type 
strategy update rules (best takes over, Fermi-rule and proportional update [13]), as well as the 
option for additional, user-defined strategy update rules in a ‘plugin’-type format; iii.) 
synchronous, and semi-synchronous updating [27]; iv.) and the option for the inclusion of 
any real world networks in a Pajek [28] format (for the description of the simulation steps see 
Text S1). The program allows setting the starting strategy of any nodes according to the wish 
of the experimenter, and introduces the novel use of edge weights by considering edge 
weights as probabilities of the game played between the corresponding nodes. A brief 
description of the NetworGame 2.0 software is given in the Methods section, a more detailed 
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description containing the pseudocode of the algorithm used is found in the Electronic 
Supplementary Material (Text S1). The program with a User Guide is freely available from 
our website: www.linkgroup.hu/NetworGame.php. 
 
Definition of game centrality as a relative importance of nodes to maintain cooperation 
Keeping in mind the relative scarcity of dynamic centrality measures [29-33] we defined a 
novel dynamic centrality, called game centrality, as follows. Initially let all nodes but node i 
cooperate, while set the initial strategy of node i to defect. Under these initial conditions the 
game centrality of a node i (GCi) is equal to the proportion of defectors averaged over the last 
50 simulation steps.  
 
In the determination of the simulation step range of the averaging process we considered two 
opposing effects. 1.) Averaging over a large number of steps resulted in more accurate 
results. 2.) However, averaging more game rounds also hindered convergence of the mean 
game centrality value, which determined the number of total rounds of the repeated game as 
described in the next paragraph. As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, game 
centrality (GC) is a relative measure useful for the comparison of the nodes in the same 
network. Therefore, GC may also be calculated and compared using more or less steps of 
average than 50. However, the selection of the last 50 game rounds as the ‘average-window’ 
avoided both potential pitfalls. 
 
Game centrality values depend on the number of time steps (game rounds) and the number of 
parallel simulations. We may minimize GC-variability by measuring the proportion of 
defectors, where already no large fluctuations can be seen. This condition can be reached 
most of the times by using prisoner’s dilemma game on real world networks (but can not be 
reached using e.g. the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice [11]). 
Ensuring this condition, in the simulations of this paper the repeated rounds of serial games 
were concluded, when the mean value of GC changed less than 0.01 (called as GC-drift 
threshold) in the last 50 rounds. Small fluctuations caused by the stochasticity of some 
strategy update rules (e.g. replicator dynamics) and by the occasional stochasticity of edge 
weights (i.e. using the edge weights as update probabilities) may be minimized by averaging 
several simulations. The number of simulations was chosen to ensure that the mean error for 
the proportion of defectors was below 0.01 in the final step (called as GC-fluctuation 
threshold). As noted earlier, GC is used for the comparison of nodes. Therefore, both the GC-
drift and GC-fluctuation thresholds may be set different than 0.01. However, selection of the 
threshold value 0.01 resulted in enough rounds of game simulations to surpass the initial 
transitional phase, often observed in repeated games, and resulted in relatively stable game 
centrality values. We note that the NetworGame simulation program can also be set to run 
simulations having a user-defined, pre-set number of game rounds. 
 
It is important to note that numerical values of GC also depend on the payoff conditions and 
payoff parameters of the actual game model, on the applied strategy update rule, on the 
synchronicity of the update, as well as on the network structure. These features, together with 
those mentioned earlier, make GC a relative measure for the comparison of nodes in the same 
network using the same game conditions. Additionally, we found that the ranking of node 
GC-s largely correlated for different strategy update rules and temptation values for the 
relatively large yeast protein-protein interaction network studied (having 2,444 nodes and 
6,271 edges; see data later). In this sense GC may also be used for a rough comparison of 
node importance to break cooperation using different game conditions. 
 
 4
In the current simulations we chose the canonical prisoner’s dilemma game with the payoff 
parameters R=3, T=6, S=0, P=1 (except for Michael’s strike network, where the temptation 
value was less: T=3.1), since selection of the maximal temptation (T) value ensured the 
largest sensitivity of the initially almost fully cooperating network to the defection of a single 
node. Simulations used the widely applied best takes over strategy update rule with 
synchronous update.  
 
Game centrality identifies influential members of Zachary’s karate club network 
Wayne Zachary [34] recorded the strength of contacts between members of a university 
karate club between 1970 and 1972. Meanwhile, the club had a dispute between the club 
president and the chief karate instructor, leading to a fission resulting in two separate clubs, 
which made this social network a gold standard for network modularization studies. To 
determine the most influential members of the karate club using the game centrality measure 
(GC) defined above, we simulated a prisoner’s dilemma game on the Zachary karate club 
network with the initial cooperation of every node except the examined, defective club 
member. Nodes #3 and #33, as well as #1, #2 and #34 had the top GC values having equal 
GC values within the first and second group of nodes and decreasing GC in the second group 
as compared to that of the first group. Node #1 corresponded to the instructor, while node #34 
represented the club president. The large efficiency of these two and the other 3 nodes to 
break cooperation is related to the fact that the 5 nodes listed above had the five highest 
degrees in the network, and they were also found among the seven nodes having the largest 
betweenness centrality values (node ID-s in the order of decreasing centralities: #1, #34, #33, 
#3, #32, #9, #2). 
 
Game centrality measures identify influential member-pairs of Michael’s strike 
network 
As a next step, we were interested, whether the game centrality of edges (i.e. the average 
proportion of defectors in the last 50 rounds, where not only a single node, but two 
neighboring nodes are both initial defectors) is also giving meaningful results. Michael’s 
strike network [35] was an excellent example to test this measure. Judd H. Michael described 
a strike in a forest product manufacturing factory. The factory had a new management, who 
wanted to change the compensation package of the workers. The two union negotiators (Sam 
and Wendle) were responsible for explaining the changes, but they failed to do so, and a 
strike broke out. The company hired Judd H. Michael to make a sociogram, which showed 
that there were three worker groups: younger, English-speaking, older, English-speaking, and 
younger, Spanish-speaking workers. Sam and Wendle formed a linked pair of nodes. Judd H. 
Michael advised to contact another linked pair of nodes, Bob and Norm – who were at the 
overlap of the three communities of the factory sociogram (see Figure S1 of Text S1) –, and 
to convince them about the changes. By following this strategy, the management solved the 
problem soon, and the strike ended.  
 
In the social dilemma game simulations of the situation we considered strikers as cooperators 
and strike-breakers as defectors in canonical prisoner’s dilemma games having the payoff 
parameters of R=3, T=3.1, S=0, P=1. Initially everybody was cooperating, but the two linked 
workers chosen to explain the changes to the others. In repeated simulations the influence of 
different negotiator-pairs was compared. Simulation of the choice of Bob and Norm showed 
that they could convince everybody to stop the strike in 100% of the simulations. Simulation 
of the choice of Sam and Wendle led to the poor result of convincing the others to stop the 
strike in 8% of the simulations with the same settings, which corresponds well with outcome 
of the real-world events [35] (we got the same results for the weak prisoner’s dilemma game; 
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data not shown). Our results show, that not only node game centrality, but also edge game 
centrality is giving a similar outcome than those happened in real-world situations. 
 
Game centrality correlates with former centrality measures and reveals novel centers of 
influence in protein-protein interaction networks 
As two proteins approach each other, they signal their status to the other via the hydrogen-
bonded network of water molecules. Binding is achieved by a complex set of consecutive 
conformational adjustments. These concerted, conditional steps were called as a ‘protein 
dance’, and can be perceived as rounds of a repeated game [6-9]. Here we used the canonical 
prisoner’s dilemma game with a maximal temptation value (T=6), since these parameters 
represent the most stringent conditions of cooperation among the most commonly used social 
dilemma games. 
 
First we examined the effect of defection of party and date hubs on the cooperation of the 
high-fidelity yeast (Saccharomyces cerevisiae) protein-protein interaction network 
(interactome) of Ekman et al. [36] using the canonical prisoner’s dilemma game. Party hubs 
are hubs, which do not change their neighborhood structure, and are often situated in the 
middle of network modules. On the contrary, date hubs change their neighbors frequently, 
and often connect various modules of the interactome. The best distinction between party 
hubs and date hubs has been a subject of recent discussions [37-43]. Prisoner’s dilemma 
game simulations confirmed the differences between the two types of hubs. In the simulations 
initially we let all the 2,444 nodes cooperate except for 30 nodes, which defected. We 
compared the average game centrality values over 2000 simulations by random sampling 30 
defecting nodes from the 63 consensus party hubs (compiled as in [43], see Table S1 of Text 
S1), or from the 145 consensus date hubs (compiled as in [43], see Table S2 of Text S1), or 
from all the 2,444 nodes, respectively. Party hubs had the largest game centrality, while date 
hubs and randomly selected node sets had smaller and smaller game centrality values, i.e. 
they distorted less and less the initial cooperation (Table 1).  Using the chi-square test we 
found that the distribution of game centralities were significantly different (χ2>400) for the 
different test cases. 
 
Next, we determined the correlation between degrees, betweenness centralities and GC-s in 
prisoner’s dilemma games of the 2,444 yeast proteins of the high fidelity yeast interactome 
[36]. Since both degree and betweenness centrality had a large number of tied values, we 
used the Goodman-Kruskal gamma test to test the association and significance of the results. 
Using canonical prisoner’s dilemma game we found that GC has a good correlation with both 
degrees and betweenness centralities (Table 2). We were also curious, which of the 3 
measures of degree, betweenness centrality or game centrality predicts better the phenotypic 
potential of yeast protein describing their ‘buffering capacity’ against evolutionary changes, 
i.e. the contribution of an individual yeast protein to the overall robustness of yeast cells [44]. 
GCs were found to be significantly (p<0.062) better predictors of genetic buffering of 
evolutionary changes than either degrees or betwenness centralities (Table 2). 
 
The functional analysis of the 171 proteins of the high-fidelity yeast interactome [36] causing 
the final cooperation level to fall from the starting value of close to 1.0 to less than 0.9 
showed the overrepresentation (p<0.001) of nucleus-related functions (35%). The second and 
third most overrepresented classes were signaling- and transport-related functions (33% and 
32%, respectively; Figure 1). These results were in compliance with the central position of 
the nucleus in the structure, organization and dynamics of the cell. Similarly, transport and 
signaling are central in both internal and external cellular communication.  
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In conclusion, game centrality observed in prisoner’s dilemma games of nodes in a yeast 
protein-protein interaction network (i.e. in a ‘protein game’) offered a novel characterization 
of the importance of proteins in complex cellular functions highlighting the importance of 
intra-modular party hubs to maintain cooperation. 
As we said before, game centrality is a comparative measure within a network having set a 
game type, strategy update rule, temptation value and synchronicity. To assess the 
consistency of game centrality ranking, we ran multiple experiments with different 
temptation values (T=3.1, 4, 5 and 6) and/or the strategy update rules (best-takes-over and 
Fermi-rule) for the yeast interactome network. We evaluated the pair-wise correlation 
(Goodman-Kruskal gamma) between the game centralities for the case of small (3.1 and 4.0) 
and large temptation values (5.0 and 6.0), while applying the best-takes-over and the Fermi-
rule strategy update rules. The smallest pair-wise correlation was 0.72 for the small 
temptation values and 0.70 for the large temptation values. These results indicate that while 
the game settings do have effects on the individual game-centrality values, GC may also be 
used for a rough comparison of node importance to break cooperation using different game 
conditions.  
Game centrality identifies functionally important segments of protein structures 
Next, we extended the use of the game centrality to another important biological network, the 
protein structure network, where the nodes are amino acids, and the edges between them 
represent chemical bonds [6,45,46]. We analyzed the protein structure network of the 
Escherichia coli methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein, for which an elegant study [46] showed 
the existence of several alternative intra-protein signal transduction pathways. These 
signaling paths span a large distance between the active centre and the anticodon binding 
region of this enzyme transmitting the allosteric conformational changes induced by substrate 
binding. The methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein has two major domains, the catalytic 
domain (responsible for the activation of methionine) and the tRNA anticodon-binding 
domain. These two domains are connected by the connecting peptide (CP) domain. The 
catalytic domain can be subdivided to three sub-domains, having two Rossmann-folds and a 
stem contact fold [46]. 
 
First, we compared the game centrality (GC) of the amino acids in the two major domains 
and their connecting peptide. The average GC values of both major domains were higher 
(both before and after substrate binding) than that of the connecting peptide domain (Table 3, 
Figure 2). In agreement with their central role in protein function, the average GC of intra-
protein signaling amino acids as defined by Ghosh and Vishveshwara [46] was especially 
high, if compared to GC-s of the rest of the amino acids (Table 3). Substrate binding induced 
a decrease of GC of most domains, which is in agreement with the development of a more 
compact structure, where amino acids may indeed have a lower individual influence on 
domain-level processes. GC differences between the open and closed conformations reflected 
that substrate binding affected most the tRNA anticodon domain and the core of the catalytic 
domain (the first Rossmann-fold domain; Table 3, Figure 2), which is again in agreement 
with the high increase of compactness around the tRNA and substrate binding pockets upon 
substrate binding. These findings are also in agreement with the prominent influence of 
binding sites on the cooperating network of amino acids revealed by molecular dynamics 
simulations [47].  
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In conclusion, game centrality values observed in prisoner’s dilemma games of individual 
amino acids of protein structure networks highlighted the importance of core protein 
domains, especially the tRNA anticodon binding domain, the active centre and intra-protein 
signaling amino acids in the maintenance of cooperation of this complex system. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper a novel program package, called NetworGame was introduced to simulate 
various social dilemma type games with a high flexibility for payoff conditions, initial 
parameters, strategies, strategy update rules and update conditions. We defined a novel 
dynamic centrality measure called game centrality (GC), and showed that it correlates with 
previous centrality measures, such as degree, or betwenness centralities. Moreover, GC also 
predicts novel influential nodes and network segments, which have a functional relevance in 
several social and biological real world networks. 
Although several game simulation tools have been described in the literature, such as 
GamePlan [22], Gambit [23], Dynamo [24] and VirtualLabs/EvoLudo [25], the NetworGame 
program package is unique in the sense, that it is able to accept any real-world networks as an 
input with the complexity of their weighted edges. Moreover, the program can handle 
individual initial strategies of all networked agents, as well as individual strategy update 
rules. The current NetworGame 2.0 version has automated, statistics-based simulation length 
and simulation count options, which were not present in its preliminary NetworGame 1.0 
version mentioned in our former conference report [26]. We note that NetworGame 2.0 can 
also be used for simulations having a user-defined, pre-set number of game rounds. 
While game centrality correlated with previous centrality measures, such as degree and 
betweenness centrality, it also predicted novel nodes and centers of large influence, which 
had functional relevance both in social and biological real-world networks. Identification of 
functionally and dynamically important network nodes and segments is not an easy field. i.) 
The identification of nodes with large and dynamic influence has been notoriously difficult 
[29-33, 48-50]. ii.) The precise discrimination between hubs with different dynamic 
parameters became a subject of recent discussions [36-43]. iii.) The contribution of individual 
proteins to the overall robustness of the cell against evolutionary changes is a largely 
unresolved question [44, 51, 52]. iv.) Though enzyme active sites and protein binding hot-
spots have been identified using network metrics, such as betweenness centrality, amino acids 
of intra-protein signaling are not readily distinguishable [53-55]. Game centrality provides a 
novel and promising aspect to compare the influence of network nodes and segments using 
the cooperation-related, complex dynamic background of social dilemma games. 
Game centrality values depend on the game model and its payoff conditions, on the applied 
strategy update rule, on the synchronicity of the update, on the network structure as well as 
on the number of time steps and total number of simulations. This makes game centrality a 
relative measure, and requires an especially large level of cautiousness in its use, when the 
level of final cooperation fluctuates (e.g. in games on square lattice [11], rock-scissors-paper 
games [56], etc.). However, the case studies we made suggest that game centrality values of 
both individual nodes and edges (pairs of neighboring nodes) can be useful for the 
comparison of influence in the same network when using the canonical prisoner’s dilemma 
game on various networks. Moreover, game centrality may be used for the comparison of 
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different states of the same network, which differ e.g. only in their weight structure, like that 
of the yeast protein-protein interaction network before and after stress [57].  
In this paper we calculated game centrality for initially defecting single nodes or edges (pairs 
of neighboring nodes) of the network. However, it is important to note that a similar 
centrality measure may also be calculated for the inverse situation, where a pair of linked 
nodes is the only initial cooperator in an otherwise defecting network. Moreover, similar 
centrality measures may also be defined for larger segments of nodes, such as for triangles, 
motifs, k-cliques, k-clans, k-clubs, k-components, k-plexes, lambda-sets, network skeletons, 
rich clubs, network cores, or network communities [43] using the NetworGame program. 
From a different point of view, game centrality indirectly measures the capability of a node to 
alter network reciprocity. A highly influential node with large game centrality tends to break 
the cooperative islands, the sources of network reciprocity in the network. In this paper we do 
not discuss network reciprocity in detail, but we refer the interested reader to references [58] 
and [59]. 
Currently NetworGame only supports pairwise interactions between the players. It is an 
interesting future work to include group interactions in NetworGame, since it is known [60] 
that group interaction can lead to behaviors that cannot be attributed to the sum of pairwise 
interactions. 
In conclusion, our NetworGame program package proved to be a useful tool for the analysis 
of repeated spatial games on real-world networks, and enabled the definition of a novel 
game-related centrality measure called game centrality (GC). Game centrality correlated with 
previous centrality measures, such as degree and betweenness centrality. Moreover, GC also 
identified novel, functionally important nodes and network segments in both social and 
biological networks. Our work opens the ground for a number of further studies on the 
dependence of game centrality of various parameters of social dilemma games as well as a 
wide variety of real world networks including neuronal networks [61]. Game centrality may 
become a useful measure to identify key network nodes of various processes of network 
dynamics, such as conformational changes, allosteric and cellular signaling, cell 
differentiation, cell reprogramming and malignant transformation. Game centrality may help 
to design more efficient interventions to cellular networks (in forms of drugs), to ecosystems 
or to social networks. 
Methods 
 
Description of the real world networks 
Zachary’s karate club network. The weighted and undirected social network of the karate 
club at a US university contained 34 nodes and 78 edges described by Wayne Zachary in 
1977 [34]. Michael’s strike network. The social network of a forest product manufacturing 
factory contained 24 nodes and 38 edges as described by Judd H. Michael in 1997 [35]. Yeast 
protein-protein interaction network. The giant component of the un-weighted and undirected 
high-fidelity yeast protein-protein interaction network [36] contained 2,444 nodes and 6,271 
edges, covering approximately half of the yeast genome and containing the most reliable ~3% 
of the expected number of total edges. E. coli methionyl-tRNA synthase protein structure 
network. We have constructed the structural network from the 3D image of the starting 
(substrate-free) and the equilibrated (substrate-bound) state of the molecular simulation of the 
E. coli methionyl-tRNA synthetase/tRNA/MetAMP complex [46] by converting the 
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Cartesian coordinates of the 3D image to distances of amino acid pairs, and keeping all non-
covalently bonded contacts within a distance of 0.4 nm. The final weighted network was 
created by removing self-loops, and calculating the inverse of the average distance between 
amino acid residues as edge weights. The protein structure network contained 547 nodes, 
since the first 3 N-terminal amino acids were not participating in the network. The protein 
structure contained 2,164 edges in the substrate-free network, and 2,153 edges in the 
substrate-bound network. 
 
Brief description of the NetworGame program package 
The NetworGame software is a program that takes a configuration specification describing 
the social dilemma game rules, the model or real world network and other settings, executes 
the simulations accordingly, and stores the simulation results. The simulation engine of the 
NetworGame program is a highly optimized software component for running the actual 
simulation. The 2.0 version of the NetworGame program is an updated version of the 
NetworGame 1.0 version published in a preliminary conference report [26]. A more detailed 
description of the NetworGame program version 2.0 containing the pseudo codes of its 
algorithms is found in the Supporting Information (Text S1). Both versions of the 
NetworGame program, as well as their User Guides are freely downloadable from our 
website: www.linkgroup.hu/NetworGame.php. 
 
Parameters of simulations and calculation of game centrality (GC) 
For the analysis of real-world networks we chose the canonical prisoner’s dilemma game 
with the payoff parameters R=3, T=6, S=0, P=1 (except for Michael’s strike network, where 
we used T=3), since this selection with a maximal temptation (T) value ensured the largest 
sensitivity of the initially almost fully cooperating network to the defection of a single node. 
In our simulations edge weights were not used. All simulations used the widely applied best 
takes over strategy update rule with a synchronous update. Simulations of repeated games 
were halted, when the mean value of cooperation changed less than 0.01 in the last 50 rounds. 
The number of parallel simulations was chosen to ensure that the mean error for the 
cooperation level was below 0.01 in the final step. These conditions allowed enough 
simulations to get a statistically meaningful mean estimate, and made the number of 
simulation steps large enough to surpass the initial transitional phase often observed in 
simulations of repeated social dilemma games. Game centrality (GC) of node i was calculated 
as the proportion of defectors averaged over the last 50 simulation steps, when initially node i 
was set to defect, while all other nodes were set to cooperate.  
 
Supporting information 
Text S1 This supporting information (Text S1) contains a supplementary figure, 2 
supplementary tables, a detailed description of the NetworGame algorithm for the simulation 
of spatial social dilemma games with pseudocodes, as well as 11 supplementary references. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Game centrality of party hubs, date hubs and randomly selected nodes of a high-
fidelity yeast protein-protein interaction network. 
 
 Consensus 
party hubsb 
Consensus 
date hubsb 
Randomly 
selected 
nodesb 
Average Game 
Centrality (GC) of 
node setsa 
0.789±0.001c 0.720±0.003 0.658±0.005 
 
aPrisoner’s dilemma game was simulated using the high-fidelity yeast interactome of Ekman 
et al. [36], and game centrality measures were calculated as described in Methods.  
bInitially all 2,444 nodes were cooperating except for 30 defecting nodes, which were 
randomly sampled 2000 times from 63 consensus party hubs (compiled as in [43], see Table 
S1 of Text S1), from 145 consensus date hubs (compiled as in [43], see Table S2 of Text S1), 
as well as from all the 2,444 nodes in the network.  
cData represent sample means ± standard error. The distributions of the game centrality 
values were significantly different according to the chi-square test (χ2>400). 
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Table 2. Correlations of game centrality (GC) with degree, betweenness centrality and 
phenotypic potential of proteins in a high fidelity yeast interactome. 
 
Correlation valuesa Degree Betweenness 
Centrality 
Game Centrality 
(GC) 
Degree --- 0.81±0.02b 
(p<0.001) 
0.61±0.04 
(p<0.001) 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
--- --- 0.62±0.04 
(p<0.001) 
Phenotypic 
potential 
0.09±0.04 
(p<0.022) 
0.07±0.04 
(p<0.083) 
0.13±0.05c 
(p<0.007) 
 
aSimulations of the prisoner’s dilemma game were performed as described in Methods using 
the parameter set of (R=3, T=6, S=0, P=1). Correlation values between degree, betweenness 
centrality, GC in prisoner’s dilemma game, as well as phenotypic potential [44] were 
calculated for the 2,444 proteins of the high fidelity yeast interactome of Ekman et al. [36].  
bData represent Goodman-Kruskal’s gamma values ± standard errors. Significance levels in 
parentheses were also calculated using Goodman-Kruskal’s gamma test (the null hypothesis 
being that the correlation is different from zero).  
cUsing the R-package correlation test (http://personality-project.org/r/html/r.test.html, [62]) 
the correlation between phenotypic potential and game centrality was significantly larger than 
the correlation between phenotypic potential and degree, or the correlation between 
phenotypic potential and betweenness centrality.  
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Table 3. Average game centrality (GC) values for E. coli methionyl-tRNA synthetase amino 
acids. 
 
 Average Game 
Centrality (GC) 
of substrate-
free proteina 
Average Game 
Centrality (GC) 
of substrate-
bound protein 
Game 
Centrality (GC) 
decrease 
Catalytic domainb 0.69 0.60 0.09 
 Rossmann-fold-1(active 
centre) 
0.73 0.56 0.17 
 Rossmann-fold-2 0.68 0.62 0.06 
 Stem contact fold (KSMKS) 0.65 0.61 0.04 
Connecting peptide (CP) domain 0.50 0.36 0.14 
tRNA anticodon-binding domain 0.63 0.41 0.22 
Signaling amino acids [39] 0.79 0.73 0.06 
Complete Met-tRNA-synthetase 0.62 0.47 0.15 
 
aProtein structure network of E coli methionyl-tRNA-synthetase was constructed, Prisoner’s 
dilemma game was simulated, and game centrality measures were calculated as described in 
Methods.  
bDomains from top to bottom: the catalytic domain including the Rossmann-fold-1 (catalytic 
function), Rossmann-fold-2 and stem contact fold (KMSKS) sub-domains; the connecting 
peptide (CP) domain; the anticodon binding, carboxy-terminal domain, 43 signaling amino 
acids involved in the transmission of conformational change as shown by Ghosh and 
Vishveshwara [46], whole methionyl-tRNA synthetase. 
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Figure 1. Functional analysis of yeast proteins having the largest game centralities. 
Prisoner’s dilemma game was simulated on a high-fidelity yeast interactome [36], and game 
centrality measures were calculated as described in Methods. 171 proteins out of the 2,444 
nodes of the high-fidelity yeast interactome were selected by selecting nodes, which 
diminished the cooperation level from ~1 to 0.9 or below. Functional analysis of the 171 
proteins was performed using the Cytoscape plug-in, BiNGO [63] to assess the over-
representation of associated Gene Ontology molecular function terms. Gene Ontology Slim 
definitions for Saccharomyces cerevisiae [64] were used discarding the evidence codes IEA 
(inferred from electronic annotation), ISS (inferred from sequence structural similarity) and 
NAS (non-traceable author statement). A hypergeometric test with false discovery rate 
correction [65] was used to select and visualize the significantly enriched GO functions at a 
level p<0.001, using the GO-s of the entire network as reference set. Colors represent 
functional categories: red, nucleus-related; blue, transport-related; green, signaling-related; 
yellow denotes other functions. The size of the circles represents the number of proteins 
found in the category. 
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Figure 2. Game centralities of E. coli methionyl-tRNA synthetase amino acids.  The 
protein structure network of E. coli methionyl-tRNA-synthetase was constructed, prisoner’s 
dilemma game was simulated, and game centrality measures were calculated as described in 
Methods. Game centralities were overlaid to the 3D image of the protein and tRNA made by 
the PyMOL program package [66]. tRNAMet is shown in green, the most influential amino 
acids spreading defection are marked red (these amino acids have the largest game centrality, 
GC values) and the least influential amino acids are blue (having the smallest GC values).  
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Summary  
 
In this Supporting Information (Text  S1) we give a detailed description of the NetworGame spatial social 
dilemma game simulation program package. Besides the pseudocode description of the NetworGame 
algorithm the Supporting Information also contains a supplementary figure, 2 supplementary tables as 
well as 11 references. 
 
 
The computer programs of the NetworGame package with a User Guide can be downloaded from 
here: www.linkgroup.hu/NetworGame.php. 
 
Table of Contents 
Supplementary Figure S1............................................................................................................. 2 
Supplementary Tables .................................................................................................................. 3 
Table S1. List of consensus party hubs............................................................................... 3 
Table S2. List of consensus date hubs ................................................................................ 4 
Description of the NetworGame algorithm ................................................................................ 5 
Supplementary References........................................................................................................... 8 
 
 
  2
 
 
Supplementary Figure S1. Michael’s strike network [1]. The three worker groups of a former 
forest product manufacturing factory containing younger, English-speaking (yellow); older, 
English-speaking (blue); or younger, Spanish-speaking workers (green) were marked. Sam and 
Wendle (top right) were the union leaders, who failed to break the strike, while Bob and Norm 
(center, marked with diamonds) were the pair of workers, who successfully broke the strike. 
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Supplementary Tables 
Table S1. List of consensus party hubs 
 
Consensus party hub 
ORFsa YHR077C 
YAR002W YHR089C 
YAR003W YHR166C 
YBL004W YHR200W 
YBL007C YIL115C 
YBL038W YJR045C 
YBL050W YJR065C 
YBL084C YJR068W 
YBL099W YJR121W 
YBR010W YKL018W 
YBR084W YKL022C 
YBR087W YKL068W 
YBR118W YKL085W 
YBR245C YKL129C 
YDL029W YLR127C 
YDL065C YLR212C 
YDL134C YMR080C 
YDL208W YMR109W 
YDL213C YMR116C 
YDR103W YNL016W 
YDR118W YNL094W 
YDR244W YNL102W 
YDR264C YNL138W 
YDR395W YNL172W 
YER157W YNL290W 
YFR002W YOL094C 
YFR036W YOR157C 
YGL004C YOR249C 
YGL153W YOR250C 
YGL200C YOR270C 
YHL030W YPL213W 
YHR016C YPR088C 
aThe open reading frame names of 63 consensus yeast party hubs were determined and listed as 
in [2] comparing the party hubs of the high fidelity yeast protein-protein interaction network [3] 
with those published in other 5 publications [4-8], and listing only those as ‘consensus party 
hubs’, which were never classified as a date hub. 
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Table S2. List of consensus date hubs 
 
Consensus date hub 
ORFsa YER095W YKL081W YNL093W 
YAL005C YER110C YKL095W YNL127W 
YBL016W YER148W YKL104C YNL135C 
YBL023C YER155C YKL166C YNL243W 
YBL093C YER165W YKL203C YNL263C 
YBL105C YFL017W-A YKR001C YNL271C 
YBL106C YFR021W YKR026C YNL298W 
YBR011C YFR028C YKR068C YOL086C 
YBR089C-A YFR034C YLL021W YOL090W 
YBR114W YGL003C YLL026W YOL108C 
YBR119W YGL092W YLL039C YOL123W 
YBR126C YGL116W YLR044C YOL133W 
YBR135W YGL198W YLR096W YOL135C 
YBR160W YGL207W YLR180W YOR039W 
YBR175W YGR009C YLR229C YOR089C 
YBR254C YGR040W YLR310C YOR106W 
YBR274W YGR086C YLR319C YOR212W 
YBR279W YGR104C YLR337C YOR244W 
YCR009C YGR134W YLR342W YOR304W 
YDL047W YGR218W YLR423C YOR308C 
YDL101C YGR274C YLR452C YPL004C 
YDL126C YHR061C YML007W YPL031C 
YDL160C YHR099W YML010W YPL082C 
YDL188C YHR152W YML064C YPL129W 
YDR142C YIL038C YML109W YPL153C 
YDR155C YIL046W YMR001C YPL161C 
YDR170C YIL094C YMR012W YPL181W 
YDR172W YJL081C YMR043W YPL248C 
YDR192C YJL095W YMR054W YPL256C 
YDR216W YJL138C YMR125W YPR054W 
YDR238C YJL141C YMR139W YPR072W 
YDR240C YJL164C YMR199W YPR086W 
YDR309C YJL187C YMR201C YPR107C 
YDR473C YJL194W YMR213W YPR119W 
YDR523C YJR066W YMR273C YPR182W 
YEL009C YJR090C YMR304W  
YER081W YJR091C YNL006W  
aThe open reading frame names of 145 consensus yeast date hubs were determined and listed as 
in [2] comparing the date hubs of the high fidelity yeast protein-protein interaction network [3] 
with those published in other 5 publications [4-8], and listing only those as ‘consensus date 
hubs’, which were never classified as a party hub. 
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Description of the NetworGame algorithm  
 
The 2.0 version of the NetworGame program is an updated version of the NetworGame 1.0 
version published in a preliminary conference report [9]. NetworGame 2.0 is available in our 
web-site (www.linkgroup.hu/NetworGame.php). The 2.0 version utilizes our experiences gained 
with the 1.0 version. The NetworGame 2.0 program package is a cross-platform, generic tool to 
simulate repeated spatial games. This simulation program includes i.) options for pay-off 
matrices of any symmetric normal form games (with 2 strategies); ii.) several well-known, 
replicator-type strategy update rules, as well as the option for additional, user-defined strategy 
update rules in a ‘plugin’-type format; iii.) synchronous, and semi-synchronous updating [10]; 
iv.) and the option for the inclusion of any real world networks in a Pajek format [11]. 
 
Here we provide the pseudocode for the algorithm, which describes the flow of the program and 
the effects of the configuration parameters. A User Guide of version 2.0 can be downloaded from 
here: www.linkgroup.hu/NetworGame.php. 
 
 
Configurator 
- testNode and testEdge are configuration parameters 
- printSteps, printStepsStdDev and printLast are configuration parameters 
- Nodes and Edges represent the network, where Edges is a set of pairs (src,dst) 
 
initialize payoff matrix 
if (testNode specified) then 
 for i in Nodes do 
  initialize strategies 
  Si = testNode 
  run simulations 
  print statistics 
 end 
else if (testEdge specified) then 
 for (src,dst) in Edges do 
  initialize strategies 
  Ssrc = testEdge 
  Sdst = testEdge 
  run simulations 
  print statistics 
 end 
else 
 initialize strategies 
 run simulations 
 if (printSteps) then print step-wise average cooperation levels 
 if (printStepsStdDev) then print step-wise standard deviances 
 if (printLast) then print average cooperation for each node at last step 
end 
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Initialize payoff matrix 
- payoffSchema is a configuration parameter 
- Payoff is the configuration parameter describing the payoff matrix 
 
if (payoffSchema = Luthi) then 
 K = minimum guaranteed payoff by a fixed strategy 
 for x = 1,2 and y = 1,2 do 
  Payoff(x,y) = Payoff(x,y) – K 
 end 
end 
Initialize strategies  
- configuration parameter initialStrategyManual is a set of pairs (node,strategy) 
- x and y are configuration parameters (initialStrategyDistribution is the pair of (x,y)) 
- Sm is the initial strategy of node m 
 
for i = 1,2,...,n do 
 if (random(0,x+y) < x) then Si = 1 else Si = 2 
end 
for (M,v) in initialStrategyManual do 
 M is the index, v is the value of the manual strategy 
 SM = v 
end 
 
Run simulations 
- M is a set of simulations 
- L is number of steps 
- n is the size of M 
- memUsage and elapsedTime are internal variables representing the current memory usage of the system and 
the ela sed time since the start of the simul tions 
- maxError is a parameter controlling the statistical accuracy
- numberofsimulations, numberofsteps, mem and time are configuration parameters 
 
if (numberofsimulations specified) then 
 n = numberofsimulations, i.e. M has size of numberofsimulations 
else 
 n = 100, i.e. M has size of 100 initially, but it can grow 
end 
 
if (numberofsteps specified) then 
 L = numberofsteps is the number of steps in each simulation 
else 
 L = 101 (and it can grow) 
end 
 
- run simulations until we reach the specified resource limits, or get below the desired statistical error 
while (memUsage < mem and elapsedTime < time) do 
 for m in M do 
  simulate m up to steps L 
 end 
 Ai = average cooperation at step i for each m in M 
 currMean = average of Ax, where x=L-50 to L  
 prevMean = average of Ax, where x=L-150 to L-100 
 stddev   = standard deviation of Ax, where x=L-50 to L 
 meanerror = sqrt(stddev / n*(n-1)) 
 if (numberofsteps unspecified and abs(prevmean-currmean) > maxError) then 
  L = L + 1 
 else if (numberofsimulation unspecified and meanerror > maxError/2) then 
  add a simulation to M (inherently n = n + 1) 
 else 
  finish simulations 
 end 
end 
- calculate statistics for printing 
for i = 1,2...,L do 
 calculate average cooperation at step i over all m in M 
 calculate standard deviation at step i over all m in M 
end 
 
for n in Nodes do 
 calculate average cooperation at last step for n over all m in M 
end 
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Simulate m up to steps L 
- Si is the current strategy of node i 
- Pi is the current payoff of node i 
- useWeights, x0 and x1 are weight parameters controlling the effect of edge weights 
- Neighbors(i) is the set of neighbors for node i 
- Payoff[i,j] is the payoff matrix value when strategy j plays against strategy j 
- payoffSchema is a configuration parameter 
 
for n = 1,2,...,L do 
- simulating current round and calculating payoffs 
 for i in Nodes do 
  Pi = 0 
  counter = 0 
- the probability of a game is dependent on the weight parameters and edge weight Wi,j 
  for j in Neighbors(i) do 
    if (not useWeights or random(0,1) <= (Wi,j-x0)/(x1-x0)) then 
     Pi = Pi + Payoff[Si,Sj] 
     counter = counter + 1 
   end 
   if (payoffSchema = degree or payoffSchema = averaging) then 
    Pi = Pi / counter (if counter > 0) 
  end 
- updating strategies (strategyUpdateRule can be implemented as a plugin, it may have memory, 
or might be one of the built-in rules: best takes over or proportional update 
 for k in Nodes do 
  Sk = strategyUpdateRule(...) 
 end 
end 
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